

**STATE OF VERMONT
PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION**

Case No. 24-0969-TF

Tariff filing of Woodstock Aqueduct Company for a change in rates, pursuant to 30 V.S.A. § 225, effective for service rendered on or after May 16, 2024	
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**SUPPLEMENTAL TESTIMONY
OF
SEAN FOLEY
ON BEHALF OF THE
VERMONT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE**

November 12, 2024

Summary: In this supplemental testimony, Mr. Foley hereby responds to the Hearing Officer's request during the October 8, 2024 Evidentiary Hearing for the above-referenced proceeding that the Vermont Department of Public Service consider alternative accounting treatments to facilitate sustainable capital funding for Woodstock Aqueduct Company.

1 **Q1. Please state your name, title, and business address.**

2 A1. My name is Sean Foley. I serve as the Chief of Finance and Economics at the Vermont
3 Department of Public Service (“Department”). My office is located at 112 State Street,
4 Montpelier, Vermont.

5 **Q2. Have you previously submitted testimony in this case?**

6 A2. Yes, I submitted prefiled direct testimony on August 7, 2024 and prefiled surrebuttal
7 testimony on October 2, 2024.

8 **Q3. What is the purpose of your supplemental testimony?**

9 A3. The purpose of this supplemental testimony is to respond to the Hearing Officer’s
10 requests made at evidentiary hearing for this proceeding.

11 **Q4. What requests did Hearing Officer Andrea Poppiti provide regarding accounting
12 treatments to support Woodstock Aqueduct Company’s (“WAC”) capital funding
13 needs?**

14 A4. During the October 8, 2024, evidentiary hearing, Hearing Officer Andrea Poppiti
15 recommended that the Department consider alternative accounting treatments to facilitate
16 sustainable capital funding for WAC. Specifically, she suggested exploring the possibility
17 of categorizing collected capital funds as regulatory assets or liabilities. This approach
18 would help structure fund allocation for compliance-driven upgrades, such as the
19 \$150,000 planned pipe replacement required to meet Vermont Department of
20 Environmental Conservation (“DEC”) standards. Hearing Officer Poppiti’s guidance
21 emphasized balancing regulatory oversight with financial sustainability to ensure that
22 WAC can manage essential DEC-mandated improvements without excessive rate impacts

1 on customers.¹

2 **Q5. What is the basis and purpose of the Department’s recommendation for establishing**
3 **capital improvement funds for WAC?**

4 A5. The Department’s recommendation to establish capital improvement funds is guided by
5 Hearing Officer Andrea Poppiti’s recommendation, as described in her October 8, 2024,
6 guidance, to explore alternative accounting treatments for sustainable capital funding.
7 Building on this guidance, the Department’s objective is to ensure that WAC can
8 responsibly fund and manage critical infrastructure projects needed to maintain safe,
9 reliable water service while protecting ratepayers. To accomplish this, we recommend
10 that WAC establish three dedicated capital improvement funds: (1) the Pipe Replacement
11 Fund, (2) the Elm Street River Crossing Fund, and (3) a DEC Hydrant Deficiency Fund.
12 Each of these funds will be supported through targeted surcharges, allowing WAC to
13 secure capital for these specific projects transparently, in compliance with Generally
14 Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).

15 **Q6. Could you describe the structure and purpose of the Pipe Replacement Fund?**

16 A6. Certainly. The Pipe Replacement Fund will accumulate the capital required to replace
17 WAC’s aging pipes, meeting a \$150,000 annual mandate set by the DEC for
18 infrastructure renewal. Funded through a specific surcharge, this dedicated account will
19 ensure that WAC has the resources to address critical pipe replacements each year. To
20 promote transparency, the Department recommends independent audits and annual
21 reporting to both the Vermont Public Utility Commission (“Commission”) and DEC,
22 detailing the surcharge collections and how funds are used.

¹ In re: Tariff Filing of Woodstock Aqueduct Company for a Change in Rates, pursuant to 30 V.S.A. Section 225, Case No. 24-0969-TF, Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, October 8, 2024, at pp. 22, 61 (Vt. P.U.C. 2024).

1 **Q7. What specific conditions are recommended to ensure the Pipe Replacement Fund is**
2 **used appropriately?**

3 A7. The Department requires that all funds collected be held in a segregated account,
4 subjected to independent audit, with detailed annual reports submitted to the Commission
5 and DEC. These conditions will ensure that the funds are used solely for pipe
6 replacement projects and protect against any redirection of resources to unrelated
7 activities.

8 **Q8. How will the DEC Hydrant Deficiency Fund be structured, and why is it necessary?**

9 A8. The DEC Hydrant Deficiency Fund is a critical addition to support system upgrades
10 required to comply with DEC standards, specifically addressing fire flow deficiencies
11 that impact hydrant performance across WAC's service area. This fund will be created
12 through a surcharge on the hydrant tariff, allowing WAC to address over \$4 million in
13 necessary upgrades. By dedicating funds through this mechanism, WAC ensures the
14 system complies with Vermont's Water Supply Rule, which mandates that hydrants
15 maintain a minimum flow rate and pressure. The fund will be separately accounted for,
16 with full transparency and annual reporting to the Commission and DEC.

17 **Q9. How does the DEC Hydrant Deficiency Fund impact the hydrant charge?**

18 A9. To finance these essential upgrades, a surcharge will be to hydrant charge, assessed to the
19 Town of Woodstock, where hydrants serve the larger community. The increased hydrant
20 charge will fund approximately \$292,759 in annual debt service for a \$4.3 million loan
21 required to address these DEC deficiencies. This proposed hydrant surcharge would be
22 approximately \$3,050 per hydrant, with surcharge revenues held in escrow specifically
23 for DEC compliance efforts.

1 **Q10. Can you describe the purpose and structure of the Elm Street River Crossing Fund?**

2 A10. The Elm Street River Crossing Fund is intended to support essential repairs to the river
3 crossing damaged by recent flooding. This fund will be created through a dedicated
4 surcharge for the Elm Street River Crossing project, with collected funds held in escrow.
5 Annual reports to the Commission and DEC will outline both the fund balance and
6 progress toward project completion. This structure ensures that ratepayer contributions
7 are strictly used for river crossing repairs.

8 **Q11. How does the Department recommend WAC manage these funds in compliance**
9 **with GAAP?**

10 A11. The Department advises that WAC adhere to GAAP, specifically FASB ASC 980
11 standards, which pertain to regulated operations. By treating surcharge revenues as
12 regulatory assets, WAC can defer the recognition of costs associated with each of these
13 projects until they are complete. This approach provides rate stability and ensures that
14 ratepayers only incur charges once the infrastructure upgrades are complete, and they
15 begin receiving the associated benefits.

16 **Q12. Could you clarify the benefit of treating surcharge revenues as regulatory assets?**

17 A12. Deferring cost recognition allows WAC to align ratepayer contributions with the
18 infrastructure's useful life, providing a more stable and predictable rate structure. By
19 recording these projects as regulatory assets and depreciating them over time, WAC can
20 recover costs gradually, rather than imposing an immediate financial burden on
21 ratepayers. This method balances necessary funding with a stable, long-term rate.

1 **Q13. What protections are in place for ratepayers if WAC is sold before the projects are**
2 **completed?**

3 A13. In the event that WAC is sold prior to project completion, the Department recommends
4 two key protections: (1) any unspent funds will either be refunded to ratepayers or
5 transferred to the new owner under the condition that the funds are solely used for
6 completing the specified projects, and (2) the Commission should stipulate that the new
7 owner assumes full responsibility for fulfilling these project commitments, ensuring that
8 the funds collected to date are applied as intended.

9 **Q14. Why does the Department recommend a surcharge instead of embedding these costs**
10 **in WAC's Cost-of-Service study or implementing a general rate increase?**

11 A14. A surcharge approach provides a clear advantage by making the purpose of each charge
12 transparent to ratepayers. With a surcharge, each project's cost appears as a dedicated
13 line item on customer bills, ensuring that ratepayer contributions are exclusively allocated
14 to the specified capital improvements. Additionally, a surcharge is temporary—it can be
15 removed once sufficient funds have been collected, unlike a general rate increase, which
16 could remain in effect indefinitely. This flexibility also provides for reallocation or
17 refunding of funds if project needs change or WAC's ownership structure shifts.

18 **Q15. Could you explain the structure and visibility of surcharges on utility bills?**

19 A15. Each surcharge will appear as a distinct line item on ratepayers' bills, labeled for each
20 specific project. For example, customers may see line items such as "Pipe Replacement
21 Surcharge," "Elm Street River Crossing Surcharge," and "DEC Hydrant Deficiency
22 Surcharge." The temporary nature of each surcharge ensures that it will be removed from
23 bills once the required funding level is achieved, promoting clarity and enabling

1 ratepayers to see exactly how their contributions are being used.

2 **Q16. How does the Department's recommendation support WAC's financial**
3 **responsibility and ratepayer protection in the long term?**

4 A16. By establishing these capital improvement funds, the Department is enabling WAC to
5 address critical infrastructure needs transparently and responsibly. The structured
6 surcharges and adherence to GAAP principles help ensure that ratepayer contributions
7 are used as intended, with robust oversight through audits and annual reporting.

8 Additionally, these protections allow WAC to move forward on necessary infrastructure
9 improvements, while preserving ratepayer interests even in the event of a sale or
10 ownership change.

11 **Q17. In conclusion, what outcomes does the Department anticipate from implementing**
12 **these recommendations?**

13 A17. The Department anticipates that these capital improvement funds, along with the
14 associated surcharges, will enable WAC to undertake critical projects in a way that
15 balances financial stability, regulatory compliance, and ratepayer protection. This
16 structure provides transparency for ratepayers, ensures funds are used as intended, and
17 addresses vital infrastructure improvements that will serve the community effectively in
18 the years ahead.

19 **Q18. What concerns does the Department have about WAC's reliance on debt and**
20 **ratepayer contributions for capital funding, given its current debt-to-equity ratio?**

21 A18. The Department has significant concerns regarding WAC's approach of funding essential
22 infrastructure projects almost entirely through debt and ratepayer-funded surcharges, with
23 little to no owner equity contributions. WAC's debt-to-equity ratio is already extremely

1 poor, indicating a high reliance on debt relative to the owners' investment in the
2 company. This heavy dependence on debt and ratepayer contributions, rather than owner
3 equity, places a substantial and ongoing financial burden on ratepayers while making the
4 utility financially vulnerable.

5
6 With an already poor debt-to-equity ratio, WAC's ability to secure additional future
7 funding at reasonable terms is compromised. Such a financial structure limits WAC's
8 flexibility to respond to future capital needs, whether for ongoing maintenance, new
9 regulatory requirements, or emergency repairs. This dependency also risks increasing
10 costs for ratepayers in the long term, as high debt levels typically lead to higher interest
11 expenses, which ratepayers ultimately bear.

12
13 Despite these financial concerns, the Department supports the proposed capital funding
14 structure described above as a necessary step to address urgent infrastructure needs. The
15 Department emphasizes, however, that a more balanced funding approach—including
16 meaningful owner equity contributions—is essential for WAC to sustainably manage
17 future capital needs. A stronger debt-to-equity balance would not only reduce the
18 financial risk to ratepayers but also improve WAC's financial health, enabling it to
19 responsibly meet infrastructure demands over the long term.

20 **Q19. Does the Department have concerns about WAC's lack of owner funding in its**
21 **capital projects?**

22 A19. Yes, the Department is concerned that WAC's owners have not contributed any
23 significant equity to fund critical capital projects, relying instead on debt and ratepayer

1 surcharges. This lack of owner investment places an undue financial burden on
2 ratepayers, who are effectively covering the costs of infrastructure improvements that
3 would normally be shared by both owners and customers in a balanced utility funding
4 model.

5
6 The Department emphasizes that capital projects, particularly those that enhance the
7 long-term value of the utility, should be supported by a reasonable level of owner equity.

8 When owners do not contribute to these necessary investments, it reflects a concerning
9 lack of commitment to the utility's financial stability and future viability. The

10 Department urges WAC to consider meaningful equity contributions as a fair and
11 responsible approach to funding essential projects, promoting a healthier financial
12 structure that ultimately benefits both ratepayers and the utility's long-term sustainability.

13 **Q20. What concerns does the Department have about any potential departures from the**
14 **Commission's "known and measurable" and "used and useful" standards in this**
15 **case?**

16 A20. The Department is concerned that departing from the Commission's established "known
17 and measurable" and "used and useful" standards could set a precedent that affects
18 regulatory consistency and transparency. These standards are foundational in ensuring
19 that only costs directly benefiting ratepayers, and verified through reliable data, are
20 included in rates. The "known and measurable" standard requires that costs are clearly
21 defined and supported by concrete data, while the "used and useful" standard ensures that
22 only assets actively providing service to ratepayers are included in the utility's rate base.
23 In situations where the Commission finds it necessary to deviate from these standards—

1 potentially due to unique or urgent circumstances affecting the utility—it is crucial that
2 the Commission’s order clearly articulates the reasoning behind such a decision. A well-
3 documented rationale would not only clarify why the departure is necessary in this
4 particular case but would also provide guidance for how similar situations should be
5 handled in the future.

6
7 The Department emphasizes that clear and transparent guidance in the Commission’s
8 order will help maintain regulatory integrity while acknowledging the specific challenges
9 WAC faces. This clarity would ensure that all parties understand the context and
10 limitations of any deviation from these established principles, preserving confidence in
11 the regulatory framework and protecting ratepayer interests.

12 **Q21. Why does the Department insist on applying the “used and useful” standard to**
13 **WAC’s capital projects?**

14 A21. The Department supports the “used and useful” standard to ensure that ratepayers only
15 pay for assets that are fully operational and delivering benefits. Deviating from this
16 principle would require ratepayers to fund assets not yet in service, setting a problematic
17 precedent. To address WAC’s capital needs, the Department recommends deferred
18 accounting treatment, aligning cost recovery with asset usage and protecting ratepayers
19 from early financial obligations.

20 **Q22. Why is the Department opposed to including principal payments in the Cost of**
21 **Service rather than relying solely on depreciation?**

22 A22. The Department believes that including principal payments in rates would place a high
23 immediate burden on ratepayers, leading to rate volatility. By using depreciation-based

1 cost recovery, principal repayment is spread over an asset's useful life, ensuring a stable,
2 predictable rate impact. This method aligns with regulatory best practices, allowing
3 ratepayers to cover costs gradually as they benefit from the assets over time.

4 **Q23. Why does the Department recommend using a five-year historical average for**
5 **operating expenses?**

6 A23. The Department's position is that a five-year historical average provides a stable, long-
7 term view, minimizing the risk of inflated cost estimates. WAC's reliance on recent data
8 could overstate future costs, particularly in categories with temporary fluctuations. Using
9 an average protects ratepayers by preventing overestimated expenses and better reflects
10 ongoing operational conditions.

11 **Q24. What is the Department's position on WAC's debt cost calculation?**

12 A24. The Department recommends that only interest costs, not principal, be included in
13 WAC's COS for debt expenses. This approach reduces rate volatility and avoids a
14 significant rate increase resulting from WAC's high debt-to-equity ratio. The Department
15 views this as essential to maintain rate stability, with principal recovered gradually
16 through depreciation.

17 **Q25. Why does the Department advocate for historical averaging of professional services**
18 **costs?**

19 A25. The Department holds that using a historical average for professional services expenses is
20 more equitable for ratepayers, smoothing out temporary cost spikes. While recognizing
21 WAC's immediate needs, the Department believes that moderating these costs through an
22 average approach will prevent ratepayer impact from short-term infrastructure.

- 1 **Q26. Does this conclude your surrebuttal testimony?**
- 2 A26. Yes, it does.

1 Affidavit of Sean Foley

2 I, Sean Foley, do hereby swear and affirm under the penalty of law that the information
3 provided in my supplemental testimony filed on behalf of the Vermont Department of
4 Public Service on November 12, 2024 is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge
5 and belief, and that I have personal knowledge of, and am able to testify as to, the
6 validity of the information contained in my testimony. I understand that if the above
7 statement is false, I may be subject to sanctions by the Commission pursuant to 30
8 V.S.A. § 30.

9
10 Date: November 12, 2024

By: /s/ Sean Foley